It is with much pleasure that we welcome readers to the June 2026 edition (citation: SLT 2026/2) of our ground-breaking journal Sports Law and Taxation (SLT) and online database https://sportslawandtaxation.com.

Sports governing bodies, especially FIFA and UEFA, are increasingly being subjected to strict compliance with European Union competition law, especially art. 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“EU”) (abuse of dominant position), particularly when their regulations restrict market access for independent organisers of new sports competitions, which results in the conditional autonomy rather than absolute power of such bodies. The question, therefore, may well be asked: where does the EU concept of the “specificity of sport”, which recognises the specific nature of sport, fit into this equation?

A question that we put to Benoit Keane, Solicitor Advocate of Keane Legal, Brussels, Belgium, a leading practitioner on EU law, and here follows his reply.

“A fine balance: the special characteristics of sport in EU law

Introduction

Ever since sport first turned up as an issue before the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), the question has been asked: is it special? Each day millions across Europe engage in sporting activities. Sport fills our newspapers with the progress of clubs or athletes being followed with intense interest. Of course, sport is special. But to what extent should its special character be recognised in European Union (“EU”) law?

In the very first case relating to sport, the ECJ considered sport to fall within the Treaty where it related to an “economic activity”. Moreover, the regulation of sport fell within the scope of the free movement rules where the sports federation adopts “rules […] aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful employment and the provision of services.”^[1] In time, the ECJ confirmed that sport also fell within the scope of EU competition law in the Meca Medina case.^[2] Then, in Biffi, the EU held sport to fall within the scope of EU citizenship rights.^[3]

As a result, there was no general exemption to sport under the EU free movement rules, competition law or citizenship law. And yet. What also emerges from the very first cases right through to recent rulings is the relevance of the special nature of sport, its specific characteristics. This is particularly the case when assessing whether the sporting regulation is justified. There are essentially three possible routes to compatibility with EU law:

1    pure sporting rules;

2    public interest reasons; or

3    economic efficiencies.

Pure sporting rules

In the UCI case, the ECJ held that pure sporting rules did not fall within the scope of EU law. Much ink has been spilt on what constitutes a pure sporting rule. It is almost always – rather derisively – termed as a narrow exception.^[4] The ECJ held that discrimination on grounds of nationality could be permitted where required to organise international competitions as the sporting considerations are extraneous to the economic activity. The pure sporting rule encompasses the rules of the game and organisational features of sport. As Advocate General Emiliou recently stated:

“The “sporting exception” encompasses, by and large, the basic “rules of the game” and some organisational aspects of a non-economic nature: for example, how matches take place (number of players, length of the match, the forms of conduct allowed or disallowed on the pitch, clothing requirements of athletes, and so forth) and how tournaments are structured (number of teams participating, number of matches per tournament, schedule of the matches, and so forth).”^[5]

The pure sporting rule is, therefore, an important principle that ensures that EU law does not interfere with sport as a game.

Public interest exception

Sport is not just a game; it is also an economic activity with revenues generated, in particular, from ticketing, sponsorship and media rights. The economic activities of professional athletes, players and coaches are also regulated, as in other professions. Competitions involving clubs require detailed and complex regulations for clubs relating to issues from their training obligations to their financial sustainability.

EU law applies to such economic sports regulations but within reason. The ECJ held in the Meca Medina case that EU competition law applies to anti-doping regulations as it affects the economic activities of athletes. The ECJ followed the “regulatory ancillary” approach established in Wouters^[6] with respect to the application of EU competition law to professional regulations to determine whether the sports rules are justified by legitimate objectives in the public interest:

“Account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them.”^[7]

Applying this approach, the ECJ had no difficulty with recognising the necessity of anti-doping rules for guaranteeing the integrity of sports competitions or protecting the health and safety of athletes. But is this stepping into the field of play? The ECJ approach was not in line with the Advocate General, who was emphatic in his view that such rules are pure sporting rules with any impact being secondary.^[8] However, the ECJ was not concerned with substituting its views with that of the sports federation but rather determining whether the rules were “excessive”.^[9] There is a reasonable margin of appreciation available to the sports federation.^[10] However, EU competition law provides an important safety valve. If there is no right under specific anti-doping rules to lower a sanction for a minor breach, then it may be that an EU competition claim could result in the rules being deemed excessive.

Since its inception, the public interest test (or “Meca Medina” test) has been applied in multiple cases on a range of issues having regard to the specific characteristics of sport:

–    multi-club ownership rules: the public interest test was applied to UEFA’s multi-club ownership (“MCO”) rules which prohibit clubs owned by the same MCO group from participating in the same UEFA club competition.^[11] In other economic contexts, there would be no reason for a private association to regulate the activities of the subsidiaries of a corporate group. However, the European Commission accepted that the MCO rules were necessary to protect the public’s perception that the relevant football club competition is fair and honest.

–    financial regulations: team sports often require detailed financial regulations due to its interdependent nature in order to ensure that clubs remain viable through the season and the league remains financially sustainable. By contrast to other sectors, no club wants to eliminate its competitors as it depends upon them to create an exciting sporting product.^[12] For example, in the Saracens case, the Panel was persuaded as to the necessity of a salary cap in English club rugby due to the inherent risk of clubs overspending on player talent to succeed or even survive a season.^[13]

–    authorisation rules: in the Superleague case, the question arose whether sports federations can legitimately regulate independent organisers of sports events when they are also active in the organisation of sports events. In other sectors, this would seem strange. However, in Superleague, the ECJ recognised that “it is legitimate to subject the organisation and conduct of international professional football competitions to common rules intended to guarantee the homogeneity and coordination of those competitions within an overall match calendar as well as, more broadly, to promote, in a suitable and effective manner, the holding of sporting competitions based on equal opportunities and merit.”^[14]

The recognition of such sports specific legitimate objectives is not, however, to say that there is an exception. As Advocate General Emiliou stated in Rogon, the public interest exception “is by no means akin to a “Get Out of Jail Free” card in the game of Monopoly given to self-governing bodies.”^[15] It is not sufficient to say that a sport regulation pursues a particular objective; it must be demonstrated. In the free movement cases of Bosman^[16] and Olympique Lyonnais^[17], the ECJ had recognised as a legitimate objective the training and development of young players, given the specific characteristics of football, but, in both cases, had found that the rules at issue did not meet the stated objectives. The approach is one of reasonableness.^[18]

Nonetheless, there was peculiar feature of the public interest test. Did the classification of the restriction of competition matter? On the one hand, art. 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) only applies if there is a restriction of competition “by object or by effect”. On the other hand, Meca Medina also refers to “restraints on freedom of action” which suggested that the public interest test determined whether the restraint on freedom of action inevitably arising from the professional regulation gave rise to a restriction of competition by object or by effect which could then be assessed under art. 101(3) TFEU.^[19] In practice, tribunals tended to keep the nature of the restriction open and focus upon the public interest test.

That all changed with Superleague. The ECJ clarified that there should first be an assessment of nature of the restriction arising from a regulation upon competition. The ECJ rejected the proposal from Advocate General Rantos that the provision on sport in the Treaty (art. 165 TFEU) gives constitutional recognition of the European Sports Model, but it did maintain its standard position that the specific characteristics of sport should be taken into account. Then came the surprise. The ECJ held that the public interest exception only applies where there is a restrictive effect upon competition; restrictions by object do not fall within its scope at all. This new test led to criticism^[20] and legal uncertainty^[21]. The limitation of the public interest exception to only restrictions of competition by effect risks undermining significantly its practical utility and putting rules designed under the previous regime in legal limbo.

The Manchester City cases^[22] illustrate the problem.^[23] In the First Award, the Panel accepted the general legitimacy of Associated Party Transactions (“APTs”) rules to ensure the effectiveness of the English Premier League’s financial regulations. However, the Panel considered that an amendment to tighten up the language created a risk of false positives in assessing the market value of APT sponsorship contracts.^[24] Likewise, an exception for shareholder loans was held to undermine the effectiveness of the rules. These findings were sufficient to reclassify the APT rule as a “by object” restriction of competition, rendering the public interest exception inapplicable.^[25] In the Second Award, the Panel held the amended APT rules were void.

The risk of incongruous outcomes where regulations are justified in the public interest (for example, under free movement) but prohibited in competition law due to the by object restriction on competition was also noted in cases before the ECJ. Advocate General Spzunar was the first to raise concerns in the Diarra case.^[26] Advocate General Emiliou in his triptych of Opinions^[27] proposed a solution: a strict approach to the categorisation of by object restrictions of competition and a less formalistic approach to art. 101(3) TFEU so public interest objectives can also be considered to be “economic benefits”.^[28] This approach is indeed logical. It would also be consistent with the stricter approach to art. 101(3) TFEU as the burden to prove the economic benefits would shift to the sports federation where there is a by object restriction whereas the burden to show the rules are excessive would remain with the claimant if the rule is merely deemed to have restrictive effects upon competition.

At time of writing, indications are that the ECJ is following a pragmatic approach. In its ruling of 30 April 2026 in Liga Portuguesa (concerning COVID19 measures adopted by Portuguese clubs relating to players), the ECJ emphasised that the “by object” restriction must be “interpreted strictly”.^[29] The ECJ recognised that sports cases are likely to require a more detailed examination of the economic and legal context in which they are adopted than say classic cartels, where experience shows such conduct is inherently harmful to competition. Importantly, the ECJ stated that this economic and legal context must also take account of the specific characteristics of sport:

“The economic and legal context of which the conduct in question forms part, it should, first, be borne in mind that the specific examination of the actual context of which the economic activities relating to the pursuit of a sport form part may involve taking account, among other elements and provided that those specific characteristics are relevant, of the nature, organisation or functioning of the sport concerned, the manner in which it is practised, the manner of interaction between the various participating stakeholders and the role played by the structures and bodies responsible for it at all levels, with which the Union is to foster cooperation, in accordance with Article 165(3) TFEU.”^[30]

The rulings in the Football Agents cases due for delivery in July 2026 may provide further illumination on just how strict an approach is to be taken to the “by object” categorisation in sport and whether public interest exception remains viable after all.

Economic efficiencies

Even with a strict approach to the “by object” categorisation, the Superleague judgment has made the conditions for an exemption relevant to the assessment of sports regulations in a way that, frankly, has not been the case since the Meca Medina ruling. Previously, art. 101(3) TFEU was generally reserved to commercial relations in sport, most notably in the decisions of the European Commission concerning the collective sale of media rights. However, public interest exceptions can be “translated” into economic efficiencies.^[31]

A good illustration of this is the Royal Antwerp case.^[32] The ECJ left open the possibility of a “by object” restriction with respect to elements of the locally trained player rules relating to association-trained players. However, the ECJ also considered that the training and development of young players – a legitimate objective long recognised in caselaw – is also an economic efficiency.

There is a risk of undue formalism to the conditions for an exemption under art. 101(3) TFEU; it cannot become practically impossible to meet the relevant conditions by simply relabelling the findings for a “by object” restriction (for example, as not being indispensable or no elimination of competition). The determination of the nature of a restriction should be separated clearly from the justification.

To take the issue of authorisation rules following the Superleague ruling, it may be that there is a finding that a sports federation pre-authorisation rules restrict competition “by object” because the authorisation framework is insufficiently transparent, giving rise to a conflict of interest between the sports federation regulatory functions and commercial activities. This should not then condemn – in toto – any justification put forward by the sports federation under art. 101(3) TFEU for its refusal to permit athletes or clubs from participating in an unauthorised competition. Should, for example, sports federations lacking an authorisation procedure be required to allow athletes to participate in an unauthorised event where doping is allowed? The duty of the sports federation to protect the integrity of the sport as well as the health and safety of athletes patently overrides any abstract restriction of competition. The context should remain central to the analysis of the justification.

Into the void

There is one underexamined area where the specific characteristics of sport may also be of relevance: what happens to regulations deemed to infringe EU competition law. The provisions are not mere contracts but regulatory regimes with global reach. A finding that such rules are void risks regulatory chaos.

Moreover, sports federations face particular challenges in replacing regulations that ordinary companies do not encounter to remedy infringements. The principle of severance may not be applicable as in ordinary contractual situations. For global federations, amending a regulatory regime often involves engaging with stakeholders around the world. Statutes often require amendment by means of annual congresses.

A reasonable period of time to reflect a ruling should, therefore, be considered for the sports federation to put in place a new regulatory regime. For example, the European Commission gave the International Skating Union 90 days to adopt a new regulatory regime for its authorisation rules.^[33] For the party that brought the case, it may be that compensation is a sufficient remedy for any harm pending the replacement of the regulatory regime. Such an approach would recognise the specific characteristics of sports governance.

Conclusions

Whilst there is no sporting exception, the exceptional nature of sport should remain core to each stage of the legal analysis in EU competition law.

There is a risk otherwise of a chilling effect upon the regulation of sport.

Competition law plays an essential role in ensuring sport remains economically competitive, but it should not become a Code du Sport Européen.”

Much to ponder indeed!

New Book

Whilst we are on the subject of European Union competition law and sport, we would mention a new book, entitled Sport and EU Competition Law: An Introductory Guide, written by Dr. Estelle Ivanova and Prof. Dr. Ian Blackshaw, which is due to be published in August 2026.

And Dr. Ivanova has, in fact, contributed an article to this issue on The PTPA antitrust litigation and the governance of professional tennis.

2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup

The twenty-third edition of this tournament takes place from 11 June till 19 July 2026 and is also the first one to feature 48 teams and three host countries, namely, Canada, Mexico and the United States (USA).

The USA is due to host 78 matches across 11 cities, with Canada and Mexico hosting 13 matches each.

It is also proving controversial off the field of play, from a legal point of view, as regards unprecedented high-ticket prices – FIFA is reportedly charging up to US$ 10,990 (around £ 8,125) for a ticket to the final, to be played at the MetLife Stadium, near New York City, on 19 July 2026 – and also raises some human rights issues.

On 24 March 2026, Football Supporters Europe (“FSE”), together with Euroconsumers (the complainants), filed a formal complaint (“the complaint”) to the European Commission against FIFA, pursuant to art. 7 and 8 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, alleging that FIFA has imposed excessive ticket prices and unfair purchasing conditions in relation to the World Cup.

The complaint centres on the alleged exploitation by FIFA of its exclusive control over the primary sale of World Cup tickets. This control is regarded as a dominant – if not monopolistic – position in a distinct downstream market for ticket sales, characterised by the FIFA role as the sole authorised seller. As such, FIFA has the ability to determine unilaterally the applicable terms and conditions of ticket sales. The complainants argue that, being in such a position, has enabled FIFA to implement pricing practices and sales conditions that would not prevail under normal competitive market constraints.

Also, according to a new 36-page report, entitled Humanity Must Win: Defending rights, tackling repression at the 2026 FIFA World Cup (“the report”) from Amnesty International, the human rights campaign group, the World Cup risks becoming “a stage for repression and a platform for authoritarian practices” and has detailed “significant risks” to fans, players, journalists, workers and local communities in the tournament’s three host countries, namely, the United States, Mexico and Canada.

The report warns that “severe restrictions on freedom of expression and peaceful protest” threaten the “safe, welcoming and inclusive” tournament that has been promised by FIFA.

Also, that the “starkest threat” to visitors to the World Cup may be “the machine of abusive, discriminatory and deadly immigration enforcement and mass detention in the USA” and that “fans face intrusive surveillance, with proposals to force visitors to make their social media accounts available for vetting, and screening for “anti-Americanism””.

Amnesty has, therefore, called upon the governments of the host countries to “meet their obligations under international human rights law, while FIFA, national FAs and sponsors all have clear responsibilities to respect human rights”.

Another issue facing the tournament is the weather to be expected. Heat, thunderstorms and even poor air quality from wildfires are all features of the summer weather in the host countries where the tournament is being held.

Humidity may also be an issue and, as part of its “commitment to player welfare”, FIFA has introduced mandatory three-minute “cooling breaks” in each half of every match of the tournament.

Many of the host cities are subject to high summer temperatures. For example, in parts of the southern United States and northern Mexico, average daytime highs are typically in the low to mid-30s °C (mid 90 °F) but can reach up to 40 °C (104 °F) during hotter spells.

When temperature, humidity, wind speeds and the strength of the sunshine combine, players are at great risk of experiencing extreme levels of heat stress on their bodies. With humidity as well, this makes it more difficult for their bodies to cool themselves and this can make things feel hotter still.

Belarussian athletes

It has been reported, on 7 May 2026, that the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) has urged international sports federations and event organisers to allow Belarussian athletes and teams competing under their national flag to return to international competitions, whilst maintaining restrictions on Russian athletes.

Both countries were suspended from Olympic competitions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belarus being a close ally of Russia.

However, a partial ban, which allowed Russian and Belarussian athletes to compete as individual neutral athletes, was introduced in 2023.

The IOC justified the move by stating that, unlike Russia, the National Olympic Committee (“NOC”) of Belarus “is in good standing and complies with the Olympic Charter”.

However, World Athletics has stated that:

“As a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, World Athletics sanctions implemented in March 2022 excluding Belarusian and Russian athletes, officials and supporting personnel from competition remain in place.”

And has added that:

“Our council has made a clear decision that when there is tangible movement towards peace negotiations it can begin to review its decisions. We all hope this will be soon, but until that happens the council continues to be united in standing behind the decision it made in March 2022 and revisited in 2023 and 2025.”

It will be interesting to see how this standoff between World Athletics and the IOC is eventually resolved!

A first for the R&A!

It has also been reported that the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St Andrews (the R&A), Scotland, has ended 272 years of tradition by appointing its first female captain, 12 years after allowing women as members.

Claire Dowling, who was born and bred in Dublin, Ireland, will be the R&A captain in 2026-2027, having been nominated by its past captains, beginning her term of office on 25 September 2026, following the traditional driving-in ceremony on the first tee of the Old Course.

Dowling was one of the first women to join the R&A in 2015. She has served on the R&A rules and general committees, including as deputy chair and is currently on the membership committee. As an amateur player, she has represented Great Britain and Ireland in the Curtis Cup on four occasions and in other tournaments. She has also won five Irish Championships, the first in 1983; the Ladies’ British Open Amateur Stroke Play Championship in 1986; and the Spanish Amateur Championship in 1987. Dowling has also chaired England Golf’s handicap and course rating committee and has also acted as a referee at The Open Golf Competition on seven occasions. It may be remarked, therefore, that she is well qualified to take on her new role as captain of the R&A!

Articles in this issue

We now turn our particular attention to some of the interesting articles which we publish in this issue of SLT.

On the sports law side, we would draw the attention of our readers to the leading article by David B. Hoppe on Esports: Who controls the games and what does it mean for stakeholders?. In his introduction, he provides the context for his subject as follows:

“Evolving from a niche hobby into a global industry generating over US$ 1.8 billion in annual revenue, with professional leagues, franchise systems, and tournaments in every major market, esports is routinely described as the “next major sport”. That framing is convenient, but legally wrong.

In traditional sports, the game itself is not ownable. Esports games are controlled property. Their franchise systems and global tournaments project institutional durability. Still, competitive play exists only with the consent of publishers, who own the underlying games and reserve the right to alter, restrict, or terminate that ecosystem at will.

Tens of millions of viewers tune in to watch elite competitors play at the highest levels as brands pour sponsorship dollars into an audience that traditional sports broadcasters struggle to reach.

By most projections, the industry will continue its steep, upward trajectory through the remainder of this decade. But that structural imbalance between capital formation and centralized intellectual property (“IP”) control defines esports’ legal architecture. It affects player leverage, team valuations, sponsor security, investor diligence, and dispute resolution. Ignore it, and every downstream agreement is mispriced.

Yet, the law has not kept pace. Governing bodies remain inconsistent across regions, player protections lag far behind those found in traditional sports, and questions about gambling, intellectual property ownership, and contract enforcement frequently receive different answers depending upon when and where they are asked. In many respects, the industry is building the plane whilst it is in the air.

The industry’s legal structure for players, teams, publishers, sponsors, and investors involves intellectual property rights, essential contracts, regulatory compliance, and dispute resolution. An understanding of these issues and counsel from an esports-specialist law firm will help stakeholders protect their interests, build durable operations, and resolve conflicts effectively.”

He concludes his article as follows:

“Courts are often ill-suited to esports disputes. Judges are often unfamiliar with the industry’s technical and commercial realities. Cross-border enforcement of domestic judgments is uncertain and costly. Proceedings are slow, and player suspensions, prize allocations, and broadcast rights assignments require resolution in days, not months.

Publisher-led arbitration has emerged as one response. Riot Games, for example, provides structured internal mechanisms for resolving disputes within its competitive ecosystem, prioritizing speed and subject-matter expertise.
At a broader level, the International Games and Esports Tribunal offers mediation and arbitration services tailored to esports conflicts. Similarly, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) provides a recognized forum with established international enforceability.
Arbitral awards from recognized bodies are generally enforceable across signatory nations under the New York Convention, covering more than 170 countries. Domestic court judgments offer no comparable global assurance.
Dispute resolution mechanisms must align with the industry’s speed and geographic dispersion. Litigation rarely does.”

We also publish another article on esports by Lucas Ferrer and Eloi González, with the intriguing title The regulation of esports in Spain – Competing without a rulebook’.

Also, another sports law article that we would mention is one by Athena Constantinou on Combating money laundering in sport – Risks, typologies, and practical responses. She introduces her subject as follows:

“Sport occupies a unique position in global society. It is simultaneously a cultural phenomenon, a multibillion‑euro industry, and a powerful vehicle for social influence. The global sports economy includes professional clubs, international federations, athlete transfers, sponsorships, media rights, betting markets, academies, agents, and major events that move vast sums of money across borders at great speed. These same characteristics that fuel growth and global appeal also make sport an attractive vehicle for money laundering (“ML”) and related financial crimes.

Over the last two decades, regulators, law enforcement agencies, and international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) have increasingly recognised sport as a high‑risk sector for ML. Criminal groups, corrupt officials, and politically exposed persons (“PEPs”) have used sports clubs, player transfers, betting markets, sponsorship deals, and even athlete foundations to disguise illicit proceeds, integrate dirty money into the legitimate economy, and enhance personal reputation.

Unlike traditional financial institutions, many sports organisations historically operated outside robust anti‑money laundering (“AML”) frameworks. Governance weaknesses, opaque ownership structures, emotional decision‑making, and limited financial sophistication further exacerbate vulnerabilities. However, the regulatory landscape is changing. Governments, sports governing bodies, and private stakeholders are now under growing pressure to implement effective AML controls and demonstrate financial integrity.

Traditionally, sports integrity frameworks have focused on match‑fixing, doping, corruption, and safeguarding. Financial crime – particularly money laundering – has often been addressed separately, if at all. This separation is artificial and counterproductive. Money laundering is not merely a financial compliance issue; it is a direct threat to sporting integrity.

Illicit money undermines the fundamental principles of fair competition, transparency, and trust. Clubs funded by criminal proceeds gain unfair sporting advantages. Athletes unknowingly involved in illicit financial structures become vulnerable to coercion, manipulation, and reputational harm. Governing bodies that tolerate opaque financing risk losing legitimacy in the eyes of fans, sponsors, and regulators.

From an integrity perspective, money laundering in sport:

–    distorts competitive balance;

–    facilitates corruption and match manipulation;

–    weakens institutional independence;

–    erodes public trust.

Therefore, AML must be integrated into integrity governance frameworks, not treated as an external or purely regulatory obligation.”

And she concludes her article as follows:

“ML in sport is not a marginal issue but a systemic financial integrity challenge. The combination of global reach, emotional attachment, complex structures, and large financial flows makes sport uniquely attractive to criminals seeking to legitimise illicit proceeds.

However, sport also possesses powerful tools for reform. By strengthening governance, applying risk‑based AML controls, enhancing transparency, and fostering a culture of integrity, the sports industry can significantly reduce its exposure to financial crime.

Effective action requires collaboration between sports organisations, regulators, financial institutions, and athletes themselves.

Countering ML in sport is not an auxiliary compliance exercise – it is a foundational element of sports integrity, good governance, and athlete protection.

Without financial integrity:

–    governance structures are hollow;

–    athlete welfare is compromised;

–    competitive fairness is illusory.

By integrating AML into integrity frameworks, strengthening governance, and empowering athletes through education, sport can move from being a vulnerability to becoming a model of ethical resilience.

The future credibility of sport depends not only on who wins on the field, but on how money moves off it. Combating money laundering in sport is not merely about compliance – it is about protecting the credibility, sustainability, and social value of sport for future generations.”

That most certainly is the case!

On the sports tax side, we would mention the article by Luca Ferrari, Alessia Murgia and Mario D’Anna on a recent court case involving a foreign sports agent and whether his activities in Italy rendered him liable for Italian tax through a permanent establishment.

They introduce their article as follows:

“Sports agents play a pivotal role in the modern sports industry, operating within an increasingly globalised market where cross‑border negotiations are the norm. In both the international and Italian contexts, the profession has enhanced in commercial relevance while simultaneously becoming the subject of intensified regulatory intervention and increased scrutiny by tax authorities.

Against this backdrop, this article examines a recent criminal judgment of the Court of Milan which, for the first time, articulates clear limits to Italy’s taxing jurisdiction over international sports intermediation activities through a strict interpretation of the permanent establishment. The analysis first outlines the domestic tax framework applicable to fees paid to non‑resident sports agents, with particular attention to the classification of such income as either business or professional and the resulting tax consequences.

Subsequently, it examines the notion of permanent establishment under Italian and international tax law, including relevant Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (“OECD”) guidance, before turning to a detailed assessment of the Milan Court’s reasoning and its far-reaching implications in the industry. The article concludes by placing the judgment within an evolving regulatory landscape and identifying the main issues that remain open for future judicial and legislative developments.”

And they conclude their article with the following comments:

“The regulatory and case-law framework outlined above appears to reflect a broader and evolving trend, progressively shaping with greater clarity the tax treatment applicable to both resident and non-resident sports agents. This is hardly surprising, considering that it is a relatively “young” profession which, for many years, operated in a largely unregulated environment.

This is somewhat of a transitional and, to some extent, exploratory phase, wherein the tax and legal framework governing the profession is still being defined. In this respect, it is worth noting that the recent Italian Prime Ministerial Decree No. 218/2025, published on 19 January 2026 (“Decree”), introduced an important clarification regarding such Italian tax framework of the profession.

In particular, art. 15 para. 8 of the Decree confirms that the newly introduced domiciliazione regime – which allows non‑resident sports agents to operate in Italy for up to six months per calendar year through cooperation with an Italian-licensed agent registered in the Italian National Register – does not, in itself, give rise to a permanent establishment in Italy. This legislative clarification significantly strengthens the position of non‑resident sports agents operating in Italy under such regime, effectively providing a clear protective framework in relation to this specific connecting factor and helping to reduce legal uncertainty in this area.

At the same time, the Decree does not rule out the possibility that a sports agent may still be considered to have a permanent establishment in Italy. It merely clarifies that such a conclusion cannot be based solely on the existence of a domiciliazione relationship. In the absence of specific interpretative guidance on this new provision from the Italian Tax Authorities, the assessment of the existence of a permanent establishment will, therefore, continue to be based on a comprehensive analysis of the relevant factual circumstances, in line with the approach adopted by the Court of Milan in the case discussed above. Conversely, the presence in Italy of an office or constant collaboration with local scouts or agents, who are economically dependent upon the foreign agent or agency, will continue to be regarded as constituting a permanent establishment.”

We would also mention the sports tax article by Adrien Khaznadji on The fiscal status of foreign image rights companies in France. He introduces his article as follows:

“It has been common practice for decades for high-profile artists, models and athletes to structure their endorsement activities through specially incorporated vehicles – typically referred to as image rights companies (“IRCs”) – rather than entering into agreements in their individual capacity. The rationale is straightforward: by interposing a company between the talent and the business partner, the individual takes advantage of the limited liability and asset protection provided by the corporate veil and seeks to defer or reduce the tax burden attached to what are often substantial sums. The legal form of these IRCs can differ based on the local practices and regulations of the jurisdiction of incorporation.

A French fashion house retaining a globally recognised figure for an ad campaign, a Premier League club licensing a star player’s image, or a luxury brand signing an international ambassador – in each of these scenarios, the commercial reality is that the contract sits not with the individual, but with a legal vehicle incorporated abroad, frequently in a low-tax jurisdiction or simply in the talent’s country of residence.

This structuring raises a deceptively simple question: where the remuneration flows to the company rather than to the individual, can the latter nonetheless be taxed in the source country on those sums? The answer, as French tax law currently stands, turns on a careful – and at times highly technical – articulation between domestic source rules, anti-avoidance provisions, and bilateral tax treaty obligations. The decision handed down by the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal on 12 March 2026 brings this tension into sharp focus and does so in a context – the world of fashion and luxury endorsement – that maps directly onto the legal and fiscal challenges faced by professional athletes and their advisers.

A British actress, named Ms B in the court decision, residing in the United Kingdom, was remunerated through two UK image rights companies (“IRCs”) – KCK Boo Ltd and Ponder Rights Ltd – via Chanel SAS, a French entity of the global luxury brand. The aggregate consideration paid to those vehicles amounted to approximately € 3.2 million for the 2015 tax year alone. The structural significance of the case lies in the interposition of an image rights company between the talent and her French principal. The procedural history should also be noted: Administrative Tribunal of Montreuil, 29 February 2024, followed by the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal (Cour administrative d’appel, “CAA”), 12 March 2026.

The decision concerns a famous actress who, at the height of her career, served as the face of one of France’s most iconic luxury houses – a set of facts that could, almost without alteration, may also apply to the commercial arrangements of a top-flight professional athlete or performing artist. The central question it poses is the following: to what extent does French tax law, both domestic and treaty-based, permit the taxation – in the hands of the non-resident talent personally – of income received by an interposed company under his or her control? The CAA answer, delivered on 12 March 2026, is unambiguous: where the French tax authorities select the wrong legal instrument, neither the domestic source rules nor the treaty framework can rescue an otherwise flawed assessment. The Court’s reasoning first exposes the limits of the basis actually relied upon (I), before revealing, in negative relief, the instrument that ought to have been deployed – one which the legislature has since moved to solidify (II)”

And reaches the following conclusions:

“Behind the glamour lies a question of considerable fiscal and legal significance. Although the talent at the center of the dispute has worked as a model, the issues the case shed lights on – the adequacy of the domestic legal basis invoked by the French tax administration in presence of an IRC, the role of anti-avoidance rules when a structure is subjected to judicial scrutiny, and the proper scope of art. 17 of bilateral tax treaties – are precisely those that arise whenever a non-resident athlete or pilot channels income through a foreign corporate vehicle. In that sense, the decision speaks well beyond the world of fashion.

The judgment of 12 March 2026 reveals the limits of the French anti-avoidance framework as it applies to the taxation of non-residents operating through interposed companies. By relying solely on art. 164 B and the UK-France double tax convention, the French tax authorities selected questionable grounds: one requires direct receipt, which was absent; the other allocates taxing rights but does not itself create a charge to tax.

Art. 155 A was available but was not deployed for unexplained reasons. The Finance Act 2024 has further strengthened this provision by bringing image rights within its scope, closing the gap exposed by recent cases. For sportspersons, whose IRC structures are materially similar to that used by Ms B, the message is unambiguous: art. 164 B only remains incapable of allocating the right to tax in the absence of direct receipt, but the reformed art. 155 A now provides the French tax administration with a new tool – covering both services and image royalties – provided that it elects to deploy it. Properly documenting the place of supply and involving a local tax advisor in the review of the contract becomes even more crucial than before.”

Incidentally, with effect from 6 April 2027, important tax changes will apply in the United Kingdom (“UK”) to sports image rights and arrangements using image rights companies, to avoid/mitigate income tax, will be subject to greater scrutiny by HMRC, the UK tax authority.

From that date, any payments, which are often substantial – for example, the image rights of Erling Haaland of Manchester City FC are estimated to be worth annually the sum of £ 10 million (around € 11.5 million) – for the commercial exploitation of sportspersons’ names, images and likenesses connected to their employment contracts will be treated as salaries, that is, employment income, rather than as separate corporate income.

In such cases, the tax burden will be significantly higher, as payments will be subject to PAYE (deduction at source under “pay as you earn” arrangements) and Employee/Employer National Insurance Contributions.

As you will see from the Table of Contents of this issue, we include, in addition to the articles mentioned above, a wide range of topical sports law and sports tax articles, which, we believe, will, once again, engage our readers’ attention and provide them with much “food for thought”.

As always, we would welcome and value our readers’ contributions in the form of articles and topical case notes and commentaries for our journal and also for posting on the SLT dedicated website https://sportslawandtaxation.com, which covers important sports legal and tax developments and issues, and also CAS Media Releases and CIES (Centre for International Sports Studies) Weekly Reports.

So, now read on and enjoy the June 2026 edition of SLT.

Dr. Rijkele Betten (Managing Editor)

Prof. Dr. Ian S. Blackshaw (Consulting Editor)

June 2026