The Netherlands: Appeal Court Confirms the Legality of UCI Centralised Prize Management Platform
By Dr Estelle Ivanova, Valloni Attorneys at Law, Zurich, Switzerland
On 19 March 2024 (published 12 April 2024), the Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch (the Dutch Court) delivered a key judgment in the case of Cycling Service v. UCI and CPA, confirming that the centralised prize management (CPM) platform of UCI, the world governing body of cycling, does not violate EU competition law.
Cycling Service, a Dutch agency involved in the distribution of prize money, challenged the 2019 UCI Regulations requiring the use of the CPM platform, claiming that it restricted market access and excluded competitors. The platform, implemented by the UCI and its affiliated Association of Professional Cyclists (CPA), centralises prize payments in men’s cycling races.
The Dutch Court concluded that the CPM platform does not restrict competition, neither by its object nor by its effects. In reaching this conclusion, it highlighted several key points:
- First, Cycling Service remained active on the market, despite the introduction of the centralised system.
- Second, the selection of the platform’s operator was based on a public tender, a process that Cycling Service itself had joined, indicating that access to the market was not entirely foreclosed.
- Finally, the judges rejected the claim of unfair exclusion, noting that the need for Cycling Service to lower its prices in response to the new system did not, in itself, amount to predatory pricing or constitute anti-competitive conduct.
Moreover, the Dutch Court did not assess the existence of a dominant position, as Cycling Service failed to clearly define the relevant market.
This ruling is particularly significant as it follows closely the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ISU and Super League judgments of 21 December 2023, which reinforced the application of EU competition law to sports governance. The Dutch Court applied a stricter evidentiary standard and required detailed proof of anticompetitive effects, raising questions about the alignment of national judgments with evolving EU standards.
In sum, the case illustrates the ongoing tension between centralisation and market access in sports regulation and reinforces the importance for challengers to substantiate their claims with robust economic and legal data.
More broadly, this ruling is also noteworthy for its implications under EU competition law.
Whilst the ruling was rendered by a Dutch court, the reasoning clearly reflects the standards developed under EU competition law, particularly with regard to restrictions by object and by effect under Article 101 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
The Dutch Court also briefly considered the issue of a potential abuse of dominance, touching upon considerations relevant to Article 102 TFEU. As national courts are required to apply EU competition rules in cases with cross-border implications, this ruling contributes to the interpretation and implementation of EU law in the sports sector at the domestic level.
As the first civil ruling by a national court in the sports sector following the CJEU ISU and Super League judgments of 21 December 2023, it offers valuable insight into how domestic courts may handle competition-related disputes in sport.
In ISU (C-124/21 P), the CJEU held that eligibility rules limiting access to unauthorised events could amount to restrictions by object, particularly when they protect the commercial interests of the governing body and hinder the emergence of competing structures. In Super League (C-333/21), the Court similarly emphasised that regulatory powers exercised by sports federations must respect principles of transparency, necessity and proportionality, especially when they have market-structuring effects.
The Dutch Court followed a more cautious and fact-driven approach, requiring concrete evidence of anticompetitive effects and declining to presume exclusionary intent, notably relying on procedural safeguards, such as the public tender process, and the continued activity of Cycling Service on the market. On this basis, it concluded that no restriction of competition, by object or by effect, could be established in this case.
This divergence in analytical intensity does not necessarily contradict the CJEU case-law, but rather reflects the discretion afforded to national courts to interpret and apply competition law within their factual and procedural frameworks. The ruling highlights the ongoing tension between centralised sports governance and market access and underscores the challenges in striking the right balance between legitimate regulatory objectives and competition law compliance.
Looking ahead, the recent Diarra judgment (C‑650/22), delivered by the CJEU after the Dutch ruling, may further inform this debate. In Diarra, the Court held that certain FIFA transfer rules could be classified as restrictions of competition by object, given their structural effects, without requiring actual market impact to be demonstrated. This more functional and purposive approach may influence how future national courts assess regulatory rules in sport under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
Altogether, the Cycling Service case illustrates the complexity of applying EU competition law to sports governance and the importance of carefully balancing regulatory coherence with open market principles. The case also shows the cautious approach taken by national courts, whilst the more recent CJEU Diarra judgment invites reflection on the appropriate standard of review for market-wide restrictions imposed by sports governing bodies.
Dr Estelle Ivanova may be contacted by e-mail at ‘
