The PTPA antitrust litigation and the governance of professional tennis

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BY DR. ESTELLE IVANOVA[1]

 

Introduction

 

In March 2025, the Professional Tennis Players Association (“PTPA”) filed a major antitrust lawsuit against the Association of Tennis Professionals (“ATP”), the Women’s Tennis Association (“WTA”), the International Tennis Federation (“ITF”), and the International Tennis Integrity Agency (“ITIA”), later extending its claims to the organisations responsible for organising the four Grand Slam tournaments, alleging the existence of a “monopsony” that suppresses player earnings and restricts fundamental economic rights[2]. Filed across multiple jurisdictions[3] – including the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom – the PTPA lawsuit contends that these governing bodies do not merely regulate professional tennis but rather operate through coordinated conduct that distorts market conditions to the detriment of players.

 

According to the PTPA, this system is sustained through a series of mutually reinforcing practices. First, the governing bodies are alleged to collude in fixing prize money at artificially low levels, thereby preventing remuneration from reflecting the substantial revenues generated by tournaments. Second, they are said to exercise pervasive control over the international calendar, imposing a dense and rigid schedule that limits players’ autonomy and bargaining power. Third, restrictions on sponsorship and commercial engagements are claimed to curtail players’ ability to exploit their individual market value.

 

The complaint further articulates a set of core antitrust grievances. It asserts that tennis authorities exploit their dominant position to eliminate competitive alternatives and dictate the terms under which players participate in the sport. In financial terms, players are reportedly confined to receiving between 10% and 20% of overall tournament revenues, a figure presented as evidence of systemic suppression of compensation. The lawsuit also challenges the alleged appropriation or restriction of players’ name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) rights, which, according to the PTPA, are imposed without adequate remuneration or genuine consent.

 

Beyond economic considerations, the lawsuit extends to working conditions. The 11-month competitive calendar is characterised as excessive and coercive, with players allegedly compelled to compete despite injury or inadequate recovery, raising concerns that intersect both labour standards and competition law. Finally, the lawsuit contends that the current governance structure effectively forecloses the emergence of rival tournaments, notably through mechanisms, such as ranking points allocation and participation rules, thereby insulating incumbent organisers from competitive pressure.

 

Founded by Novak Djokovic and Vašek Pospíšil, the PTPA seeks not merely incremental reform but a fundamental reconfiguration of the economic and institutional framework of professional tennis. In its view, the existing system entrenches an imbalance of power that is both structurally and legally unsustainable.

 

The defendants, for their part, have firmly rejected these allegations. The ATP, in particular, has criticised the proceedings as fostering “division and distraction” rather than constructive reform. As of early 2026, the litigation remains ongoing across multiple jurisdictions, posing a direct challenge to the traditional governance model of tennis and raising broader questions as to the compatibility of sports regulation with competition law.

 

At its core, the litigation raises a fundamental question: to what extent can sports governing bodies exercise regulatory authority without infringing competition law?

 

This article examines the legal architecture of the PTPA claims, situates them within comparative antitrust jurisprudence, and evaluates their potential to reshape the governance of professional tennis – and, by extension, global sport. To appreciate fully the nature of these allegations, it is first necessary to consider the institutional structure through which professional tennis is organised.

 

The dual function of professional tennis governance

 

Professional tennis is governed through a model that is, at least in appearance, decentralised, although the relationship between its principal institutions has increasingly given rise to allegations of coordination. Unlike closed leagues, it is not organised around a single entity, but rather through a constellation of institutions exercising distinct, although interconnected, functions.

 

The Association of Tennis Professionals (“ATP”) and the Women’s Tennis Association (“WTA”), both originally established as representative bodies for players, have progressively evolved into entities that simultaneously regulate and organise the men’s and women’s professional circuits respectively. Each operates through a tiered structure, combining a principal global tour with secondary circuits designed to serve as developmental pathways for lower-ranked players.

 

Crucially, both organisations perform a dual role. Beyond regulating participation and competition, they also engage in the commercial exploitation of the sport through broadcasting rights, sponsorship agreements, ticket sales, licensing arrangements, and related revenue-generating activities. This concentration of regulatory and economic functions lies at the heart of the concerns raised in the PTPA lawsuit.

 

Alongside these tour organisers, the International Tennis Federation (“ITF”) acts as the global governing body of tennis, bringing together national federations and retaining responsibility for the Rules of Tennis and the organisation of major international competitions, including an important role in the governance of the Grand Slam events. Like the ATP and WTA, the ITF combines regulatory authority with the organisation and commercialisation of competitions.

 

The International Tennis Integrity Agency (“ITIA”), established in 2021 by the ATP, WTA, ITF, and the Grand Slam organisations, is tasked with enforcing anti-doping and anti-corruption rules within professional tennis.

 

The four Grand Slam tournaments, which are organised respectively by Tennis Australia, the French Tennis Federation, the All England Lawn Tennis Club, and the United States Tennis Association, meanwhile, occupy a singular position within this ecosystem. Although formally independent, they represent the most prestigious and commercially valuable events in professional tennis and remain closely integrated into the broader governance structure of the sport.

 

It is this institutional configuration that lies at the heart of the PTPA lawsuit.

 

More broadly, the concentration of regulatory and commercial functions, together with the close interrelationship between the governing bodies, has placed the governance of professional tennis under increasing competition law scrutiny.

 

A transnational competition law strategy

 

One of the most striking features of the PTPA lawsuit lies in its distinctly transnational character. Rather than confining its challenge to a single jurisdiction, the PTPA and the player claimants have initiated parallel proceedings and complaints across the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, thereby seeking to mobilise multiple competition law regimes against the governance structure of professional tennis.

 

On 18 March 2025, proceedings were brought before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the ATP, WTA, ITF, and ITIA. The US complaint alleges violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and seeks, inter alia, injunctive relief, compensatory and treble damages, and the disgorgement of profits allegedly derived from anticompetitive conduct. Central to the complaint is the allegation that the defendants collectively operate unlawful monopsonies and engage in concerted practices restricting competition within professional tennis.

 

On the same date, the claimants also initiated legal action in the United Kingdom through both a formal complaint to the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) and a letter before action addressed to the sport’s governing bodies. The UK proceedings similarly allege that the defendants misused their regulatory powers in breach of Chapters I and II of the Competition Act 1998, the domestic equivalents of art. 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).

 

At the European (EU) level, the complainants likewise have submitted a formal complaint to the European Commission on 18 March 2025, pursuant to art. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, alleging infringements of art. 101 and 102 TFEU. The EU complaint argues that the rules and practices adopted by the governing bodies restrict competition and reinforce their collective control over professional tennis. Notably, the complainants have confirmed that no parallel proceedings had been initiated before national courts or competition authorities within the European Union.

 

Taken together, these parallel proceedings reveal a broader competition law strategy aimed at challenging the governance of professional tennis simultaneously under several major competition law frameworks. They also highlight the increasingly global nature of sports governance disputes, where regulatory structures, commercial interests, and athletes’ economic rights intersect across multiple jurisdictions.

 

Competition law perspectives

 

The claims advanced by the PTPA reflect a broader trend towards increased judicial scrutiny of sports governance structures under competition law. Whilst the approaches adopted in the EU and the US differ in important respects, both legal systems raise significant questions regarding the compatibility of modern sports governance structures with competition law principles.

 

The EU dimension of the PTPA litigation must be understood against the broader evolution of EU sports law and competition law jurisprudence. It is now firmly established that sporting activities are not exempt from the application of EU competition rules merely because they pursue regulatory, educational, or social objectives. Although art. 165 TFEU recognises the specific nature and social function of sport within the European legal order, it does not create a general exemption from EU competition law.

 

The recognition of the “specificity of sport” within EU law nevertheless remains an important contextual consideration. The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) and the European Commission have repeatedly acknowledged that certain sporting rules may pursue legitimate objectives linked to the integrity of competitions, competitive balance, athlete welfare, or the proper organisation of sport, provided that the restrictions resulting from such rules remain inherent and proportionate to those objectives. However, such considerations do not remove sporting regulations from the scope of EU law; rather, they require an assessment of whether the restrictions imposed are inherent, necessary, and proportionate to the legitimate objectives pursued. The PTPA lawsuit, therefore, emerges within a legal environment increasingly concerned with ensuring that the autonomy traditionally enjoyed by sports governing bodies remains compatible with broader principles of market access, transparency, and effective competition.

 

Since early judgments such as Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale[4], Donà v. Mantero[5] and Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Bosman[6], the CJEU has consistently recognised that, insofar as sport constitutes an economic activity, it falls within the scope of EU law. This principle was further clarified in Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission[7], where the CJEU confirmed that sporting rules remain subject to art. 101 and 102 TFEU where they produce economic effects liable to restrict competition.

 

This scrutiny has intensified in recent years. In International Skating Union v. European Commission[8], the CJEU held that rules preventing athletes from participating in non-authorised events under threat of sanctions could amount to restrictions of competition “by object” contrary to art. 101 TFEU. The CJEU further emphasised that sports governing bodies exercising both regulatory and commercial functions must operate within transparent, objective, non-discriminatory, and proportionate frameworks. The same underlying logic was reflected in European Superleague Company SL v. FIFA and UEFA[9], where the FIFA and UEFA prior-authorisation system for rival competitions was found capable of infringing art. 101 and 102 TFEU. Comparable issues also arose in SA Royal Antwerp Football Club v. Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL[10], concerning “home-grown players” rules and the free movement of workers, whilst FIFA v. Lassana Diarra[11] further illustrates the CJEU willingness to scrutinise sporting regulations through the combined lens of competition law and free movement principles.

 

These decisions are particularly significant insofar as they address a recurring structural issue in modern sport governance: the concentration of regulatory authority and commercial interests within the same institutional actors. The CJEU recent case law reflects growing concern that sports governing bodies exercising control over market access may give rise to concerns under competition law where adequate procedural safeguards and objective criteria are absent.

 

It is precisely within this legal context that the PTPA lawsuit seeks to characterise the ATP, WTA, and ITF as both undertakings and associations of undertakings within the meaning of art. 101 and 102 TFEU. According to the complainants, these entities do not merely regulate professional tennis but also participate directly in the organisation and commercial exploitation of tournaments through broadcasting rights, sponsorship agreements, licensing arrangements, ticketing revenues, and related commercial activities. The lawsuit further argues that mechanisms, such as ranking points allocation, participation restrictions, and the concentration of regulatory and commercial powers within the same governing bodies, may restrict market access and limit the emergence of rival tournaments.

 

The United Kingdom (“UK”) proceedings may likewise prove significant, particularly given the close conceptual proximity between Chapters I and II of the Competition Act 1998 and art. 101 and 102 TFEU, notwithstanding the post-brexit autonomy of UK competition law.

 

By contrast, the US approach to sports governance under antitrust law has historically been more deferential. The US proceedings rely primarily upon Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and place particular emphasis on allegations of monopsony power in the market for professional tennis players’ services. According to the lawsuit, the governing bodies collectively exercise overwhelming buyer power enabling them to suppress player compensation and restrict alternative economic opportunities.

 

Unlike athletes participating in many North American professional team sports leagues, tennis players are not represented through collective bargaining structures and are, generally, classified as independent contractors rather than employees. As a result, antitrust litigation may constitute one of the few legal avenues through which players can collectively challenge restrictions affecting their economic opportunities, market access, and working conditions.

 

Recent disputes in individual professional sports, including the litigation arising from LIV Golf and the UFC antitrust proceedings, illustrate the difficulties athletes may encounter when seeking to challenge the regulatory or commercial structures of established sports organisations under US antitrust law.[12] These disputes also demonstrate the increasingly important role played by antitrust law where athletes, operating outside traditional collective bargaining frameworks, seek to contest concentrated governance and economic power within professional sport. Nevertheless, the US courts have often accepted that certain restrictive sports rules may be justified by legitimate objectives linked to the integrity, stability, and organisation of professional competitions. This judicial tendency towards deference may, therefore, constitute a significant obstacle for the PTPA claims in the United States.

 

The contrast with the evolving EU approach is particularly notable. Whilst recent EU jurisprudence demonstrates an increasing willingness to subject sports governing bodies to rigorous competition law scrutiny, US courts have traditionally afforded sports organisations broader discretion in regulating professional competitions and preserving existing governance structures.

 

As illustrated by other recent disputes in professional sport, including the LIV Golf litigation, large-scale antitrust conflicts involving sports governance bodies may ultimately generate pressure towards negotiated solutions rather than definitive judicial determinations on the merits.[13]

 

Mandatory arbitration and procedural constraints

 

Beyond the competition law issues raised by the governance structure of professional tennis, the PTPA lawsuit also challenges a number of procedural mechanisms imposed upon players as a condition of participation in the professional circuit. In particular, attention is drawn to mandatory arbitration clauses, waivers of claims, and extensive contractual obligations incorporated into the ATP and WTA regulatory frameworks.

 

According to the PTPA lawsuit, professional players wishing to participate in ATP or WTA events are required to accept a series of binding agreements incorporating the relevant rulebooks, bylaws, disciplinary procedures, and integrity regulations. Participation in tournaments and inclusion in the official rankings systems are, therefore, conditional upon acceptance of these institutional rules and dispute resolution mechanisms.

 

Under the ATP framework, disputes relating to the application of the ATP Rulebook must be submitted to arbitration in Switzerland. Similarly, the WTA Rulebook requires players to submit disputes relating to the application of its rules to mandatory arbitration proceedings. In both systems, players must sign membership and participation agreements through which they undertake to comply with the decisions, regulations, and disciplinary processes established by the governing bodies.

 

The PTPA lawsuit also challenges provisions requiring players, as a condition of membership, to waive certain claims against the governing bodies and affiliated tournaments in relation to decisions adopted within their regulatory jurisdiction. According to the PTPA lawsuit, these arrangements contribute to an imbalance of bargaining power between players and governing institutions and may further reinforce the closed nature of the existing governance structure.

 

In addition, players are required to submit to the integrity and disciplinary framework administered by the ITIA, including anti-corruption and anti-doping procedures, as a condition for participation in professional tennis and inclusion in the official ranking systems.

 

More broadly, these allegations raise wider questions concerning the relationship between mandatory arbitration mechanisms in international sport and the effective protection of athletes’ procedural rights. Whilst centralised dispute resolution systems are often justified by the need to ensure consistency, uniformity, and regulatory coherence within international sport, the PTPA lawsuit illustrates the tensions that may arise where such mechanisms are combined with concentrated regulatory and commercial authority. The dispute, therefore, reflects broader debates concerning access to justice, bargaining asymmetries between athletes and governing bodies, and the limits of contractual consent within highly regulated sports structures.

 

Towards negotiated reform?

 

The responses of the governing bodies to the PTPA lawsuit have reflected differing institutional positions, but also suggest the possibility that the dispute may ultimately evolve beyond the courtroom. Following the initiation of proceedings, both the ATP and WTA strongly rejected the allegations, defending their roles in the development and commercial growth of professional tennis and characterising the claims as misguided and without merit. The ITF adopted a more restrained position, whilst the ITIA limited its response to matters relating to integrity and regulatory engagement.

 

A significant development nevertheless occurred in December 2025, when Tennis Australia reportedly reached an undisclosed settlement agreement with the PTPA, thereby departing from the approach adopted by the other Grand Slam organisers, which continued to seek dismissal of the proceedings.[14] Although the terms of the settlement remain confidential, this development may indicate a growing recognition within certain parts of the sport that, at least, some structural reforms could prove preferable to prolonged and uncertain litigation.

 

Indeed, competition law disputes involving sports governance bodies have frequently generated pressure for institutional compromise rather than definitive judicial resolution. The complexity of the proceedings, their transnational nature, and the potentially far-reaching consequences of an adverse judgment may encourage negotiated solutions, which address issues such as revenue distribution, scheduling, player representation, and commercial rights.

 

Whether the PTPA lawsuit ultimately results in judicial intervention or negotiated reform remains uncertain. What already appears clear, however, is that the legal proceedings have intensified scrutiny of the governance structure of professional tennis and accelerated broader debates concerning the balance between regulatory authority, commercial power, and athletes’ economic rights within modern sport.

 

Conclusions

 

Regardless of its ultimate outcome, the PTPA lawsuit already represents a significant moment in the evolution of sports governance. By framing long-standing concerns relating to player compensation, commercial freedom, and regulatory control through the lens of competition law, the proceedings reflect a broader shift in the relationship between athletes and governing institutions.

 

The PTPA lawsuit ultimately raises questions, which extend far beyond tennis itself, touching upon the extent to which modern sports governance structures can continue to rely upon regulatory autonomy in an increasingly commercialised and legally scrutinised environment.

 

More broadly, the PTPA lawsuit illustrates the growing intersection between sport, global commerce, labour relations, and competition law. As professional sport continues to evolve into an increasingly sophisticated transnational economic sector, sports governing bodies may face mounting pressure to reconcile traditional models of regulatory autonomy with heightened demands for transparency, accountability, and athlete participation in decision-making processes.

 

In this respect, the PTPA lawsuit may ultimately prove significant not only for tennis, but also for the future evolution of international sports governance more generally.